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C00002 00002	KOREA'S AMERICAN POLICY
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KOREA'S AMERICAN POLICY


	Some foreign countries are considered active; one speculates
about what they will do.  Others are considered passive; one wonders
what will happen to them and what we should do about them.  Korea (South)
is in the latter category, but this time I want to consider what they
can do about us rather than the other way around.

	If they do nothing, their future is uncertain and probably
gloomy.  The problem is that America has commitments to them that
Ford and Kissinger maintain and on the basis of which they are
demanding suitable behavior from the Koreans.  However, if it ever
becomes necessary to fulfill these commitments, Congress will
almost certainly renege with the substantial support of a majority
of the American people.
Already Senator Kennedy and 115 other Congressmen have told
Ford that they can't support military aid to Korea while
Korea is undemocratic.  However, they haven't said what it
would take to satisfy them and presumably they differ among
themselves on that.  It seems clear that nothing would satisfy
some of them; they simply need a reason to show a firm refusal
to get involved in another Vietnam-like situation.

	Besides that several presidential candidates, including
Democratic front-runner Jimmy Carter, have said they would
reconsider American commitments to South Korea once elected.
All this is our option; now let's see what options the Koreans
have.

	Park can try to convince us he is Democratic, but nothing
plausible would convince us.  Releasing a few or even all his
political prisoners would only lead to increased demands.
American liberal critics of Korea are at least socialist
as far as foreign countries are concerned, and nothing
less could convince them anything had changed.  Even that
might not satisfy those determined to avoid foreign military
aid.

	Besides that, he is not a democrat - either economically
or politically.  Economically he believes that substantially
unrestrained free enterprise is responsible for the rapid
economic growth South Korea has achieved.  Politically, he
has reason to believe that his opposition would destroy the
country's economic and defensive capability in deciding how
socialist to become.

	The opposition has few options.  It can be a loyal
opposition and probably not get much reward from Park.
Otherwise, it can take Park as the main enemy and take its
chances on letting the North Koreans take over.  At present
it is too weak and too suppressed to reduce the country's
strength much, so it can avoid that hard decision.

	However, Park and any South Korean who is worried
about the much more brutal dictatorship to the North, has
a real problem.  Any war could use up several billion
dollars worth of supplies a month, and only the U.S. and
the Soviet Union can supply such amounts.  If the U.S.
Congress refuses to supply him, and the Soviets supply
the North Koreans, no initial success in conventional
warfare will help.

	There is only one solution for the South Koreans -
to acquire their own nuclear deterrent.